



Push-Button Verification of File Systems via Crash Refinement

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File systems are hard to get right

- Complex hierarchical on-disk data structures
- Maintain consistency in the face of crashes



Example: Missing flush in ext4

```
269 +     /* Make sure all replayed data is on permanent storage */
270 +     if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_BARRIER)
271 +         blkdev_issue_flush(journal->j_fs_dev, GFP_KERNEL, NULL);
```

- Bugs are hard to reproduce
- Hard to test fixes

It's unlikely this will be necessary [...] but we need this in order to guarantee correctness.

File System Developers

Verification: Effective at eliminating bugs, but costly

- Prove the absence of bugs
 - ▶ BilbyFS [ASPLOS 2016]
 - ▶ FSCQ [SOSP 2015]
- Requires expertise and are labor intensive

impl  2,000

proof  20,000

Goal: Push-button verification

- No manual annotation / proof of implementation
- Get a concrete test case for any bug
- Our approach: System design to leverage a state-of-the-art automated theorem prover, Z3.



Push-button verification: Challenges

- **Need a formalization of correctness**
 - ▶ Needs to capture crash & recovery
 - ▶ Needs to be automatically verifiable
- **Too many states to exhaust**
 - ▶ Disks are large
 - ▶ Many execution paths
 - ▶ Non-determinism
- **Prior work focused on bug finding**
 - ▶ eXplode [OSDI '06], EXE [CCS '06]
 - ▶ Useful, but incomplete




Contributions and outlines


- Yggdrasil ['yggdrasil]:
A toolkit for building verified file systems
- *Crash refinement*
 - ▶ A new definition of file-system correctness
 - ▶ Enable modularity to scale verification
- Case study: The Yxv6 file system
 - ▶ Similar to ext3 and xv6, but guarantees functional correctness and crash safety



Yggdrasil Overview (Green – trusted components)



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Yggdrasil Overview (Green – trusted components)

specification

implementation


consistency
invariants

```
class TxnDisk(BaseSpec):
    def begin_tx(self):
        self._txn = []


    def write_tx(self, bid, data):
        self._cache = self._cache.update(bid, data)
        self._txn.append((bid, data))

    def commit_tx(self):
        with self._mach.transaction():
            for bid, data in self._txn:
                self._disk = self._disk.update(bid, data)
```


Yggdrasil Overview (Green – trusted components)




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


Summary of the Yggdrasil toolkit

- Easy to use, no complex logic required
- Useful test-cases for bugs
- Limitations
 - ▶ No concurrency
 - ▶ Unverified Python to C compiler and FUSE


Straw-man approach to verify FS

- Model FS as a state machine with a set of operations {mknod, rename, etc.}.



- Limitation: Doesn't capture crashes

Crash refinement: Intuition



- Formalize this intuition
 - ➊ Capture crashes explicitly with a *crash schedule*
 - ➋ Use the *crash schedule* to define correctness

Crash refinement 1/2: Crash schedule

- Explicit *crash-schedule*
 - ▶ A set of boolean variables
 - ▶ Captures crashes and disk reorderings

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Operation	Schedule	Disk state
$\text{write}(a1, v1)$		
$\text{write}(a2, v2)$		

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	Operation	Schedule	Disk state
⇒	write(a_1, v_1)	{ b_1 }	
	write(a_2, v_2)		

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Operation	Schedule	Disk state
⇒ write(a_1, v_1)	{ b_1 }	$d [a_1 \mapsto \text{if } b_1 \text{ then } v_1 \text{ else old}(a_1)]$

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⇒ write(a_2, v_2)	{ b_1, b_2 }	$d \begin{bmatrix} a_1 \mapsto \text{if } b_1 \text{ then } v_1 \text{ else old}(a_1) \\ a_2 \mapsto \text{if } b_2 \text{ then } v_2 \text{ else old}(a_2) \end{bmatrix}$

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$\text{write}(a2, v2)$	$\{b1, b2\}$	$d \begin{bmatrix} a1 \mapsto \text{if } b1 \text{ then } v1 \text{ else old}(a1) \\ a2 \mapsto \text{if } b2 \text{ then } v2 \text{ else old}(a2) \end{bmatrix}$

- Note: this program can produce 4 possible states

Crash refinement 2/2: Definition

- ① Augment each op in FS with an explicit *crash schedule*: $op(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}) \rightarrow disk$
- ② For each $op \in FS$, prove:
$$\forall disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}_{impl}. \exists \mathbf{sched}_{spec}.$$
$$op_{spec}(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}_{spec}) = op_{impl}(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}_{impl})$$
- Z3 is good at solving this particular form

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implementation states

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Crash refinement 2/2: Definition

- ① Augment each op in FS with an explicit *crash schedule*: $op(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}) \rightarrow disk$

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
$$op_{spec}(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}_{spec}) = op_{impl}(disk, \mathbf{inp}, \mathbf{sched}_{impl})$$

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Crash refinement summary

- Amenable to automatic verification using Z3
- Enables modular, scalable verification
- Example: Decouple logical / physical data layout
 - Verify a simple layout first (ex. one inode per block)
 - Prove a separate crash-refinement for efficient layout
- Example: Stacking of layered abstractions

Verifying multiple layers: Straw-man approach



- specification
- implementation

Verifying multiple layers: Straw-man approach

regular files, symbolic
links, and directories

xv6 files

xv6 inodes

write-ahead logging

disk




specification



implementation

Yxv6 file system: Stack of layered abstractions

- Each layer has a specification
- Each layer builds upon a lower layer specification
- Limit verification to a single layer at a time



Implementation using Python and Z3

- Two Yxv6 variants
 - ▶ Yxv6+sync: similar to xv6, FSCQ and ext4+sync
 - ▶ Yxv6+group_commit: an optimized Yxv6+sync

component	specification	implementation	consistency inv
Yxv6	250	1,500	5
infrastructure	—	1,500	—
FUSE stub	—	250	—

- Also built: YminLFS, Ycp and Ylog
- No manual proofs!

Yxv6 evaluation

- ① How long does it take to verify?
- ② Is the implementation actually correct?
- ③ What is the development effort for Yxv6?
- ④ Is the performance of Yxv6 reasonable?

Yxv6 evaluation 1/4: Verification time

Let's see how many days it takes to verify Yxv6+sync

Yxv6 evaluation 2/4: Correctness


- Passed Linux testing project's fsstress
- Passed SibylFS [SOSP '15] Posix compliance test
 - ▶ Except for incomplete features (ex. hard links, acl)
- Passed manual crash and inspection tests
- Self hosting its development on Linux

Yxv6 evaluation 3/4: Development effort

- 4 months exploring ways to scale verification
- 2-3 months building Yxv6+sync until self hosting
- Past 6 months: Experiment with optimizations


Yxv6 evaluation 4/4: Runtime performance

- Yxv6+sync similar to FSCQ and ext4+sync
- Yxv6+group_commit
 - ▶ 3–150× faster than ext4+sync
 - ▶ Within 10× of ext4+default



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Yxv6 evaluation 1/4: Verification time revisited

Yxv6 evaluation 1/4: Verification time revisited

- Yxv6+sync takes about a minute to verify
- Yxv6+group_commit
 - ▶ Larger log, longer verification time.
 - ▶ 1.6 hours using 24 cores

Conclusion

- Push-button verification is feasible for FS
 - ▶ No manual proofs on implementation
 - ▶ Generate test-cases for bugs
- Design systems to enable automatic, modular verification
- Towards integration of verification into daily development